ÿþ<htmlÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<headÿþ>ÿþ<script type="text/javascript" src="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/js/bundle-playback.js?v=2N_sDSC0" charset="utf-8"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/js/wombat.js?v=txqj7nKC" charset="utf-8"></script>ÿþ ÿþ<script>window.RufflePlayer=window.RufflePlayer||{};window.RufflePlayer.config={"autoplay":"on","unmuteOverlay":"hidden","showSwfDownload":true};</script> <script type="text/javascript" src="ÿþhttps://web-static.archive.org/_static/ÿþjs/ruffle/ruffle.js"></script> ÿþ<script type="text/javascript"> ÿþ __wm.init(ÿþ"https://web.archive.org/web"ÿþ); __wm.wombat(ÿþ"http://www.newsocialist.org/old_mag/magazine/09/article12.html"ÿþ,ÿþ"20100626205509"ÿþ,ÿþ"https://web.archive.org/"ÿþ,ÿþ"web"ÿþ,ÿþ"https://web-static.archive.org/_static/"ÿþ, "ÿþ1277585709ÿþ"); </script> ÿþ<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/css/banner-styles.css?v=1utQkbB3" /> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/css/iconochive.css?v=3PDvdIFv" />ÿþ ÿþ<!-- End Wayback Rewrite JS Include --> ÿþ ÿþ<titleÿþ>ÿþNew Socialist Magazine, Peru in Crisis - Articleÿþ</title>ÿþ ÿþ<metaÿþ ÿþname="description"ÿþ ÿþcontent="New Socialist Group socialism communism socialists communists "ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<metaÿþ ÿþname="keywords"ÿþ ÿþcontent="socialism, communism, socialists, communists, marx, marxists, marxism, Marx, Marxists, Marxism, Canada, politics, anarchism, Trotsky, trotskyism, NDP, radical, revolution, revolutionary, Lenin, leninism, leninist, Luxemburg, working class, 1917, syndicalism, radicalism, union, labour, anarchy"ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ</head>ÿþ ÿþ<bodyÿþ ÿþtopmargin="20"ÿþ ÿþleftmargin="20"ÿþ ÿþmarginheight="20"ÿþ ÿþmarginwidth="20"ÿþ ÿþbgcolor="#FFFFFF"ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<fontÿþ ÿþface="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"ÿþ ÿþsize="5"ÿþ ÿþcolor="#000000"ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<centerÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<bÿþ>ÿþPeru in Crisis ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ</b>ÿþ</font>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<fontÿþ ÿþface="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"ÿþ ÿþsize="2"ÿþ ÿþcolor="#000000"ÿþ>ÿþ by Wilder Roblesÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<iÿþ>ÿþNew Socialist Magazine, July - August 1997ÿþ</i>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ</center>ÿþ ÿþ<centerÿþ>ÿþ<imgÿþ ÿþsrc="/web/20100626205509im_/http://www.newsocialist.org/old_mag/magazine/09/article12.jpg"ÿþ>ÿþ</center>ÿþ ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990 marked a turning point in the establishment of a repressive state apparatus in Peru. Over the last seven years, the Fujimori regime has tightly integrated the army, the national police, the judiciary, the legislature and the national intelligence services, into a repressive machinery whose main goal has been to confront and crush any popular mobilization that challenges the status quo. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Fujimori's Peru is a police state masked by constitutional legality. The concentration of political power in the presidency, the army and the national intelligence services has helped to consolidate Fujimori's regime to an extent unparalled in Peruvian history. On the one hand, the regime has introduced "free market economics," aggressively courted foreign investment, and privatized important state corporations, particularly in mining, banking services, electricity, communications, and government services. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ On the other hand, the regime has drastically curtailed the power of the judiciary, given a free hand to the military to confront guerrilla groups, introduced tough antiterrorist measures, organized a well funded political machine to control the congress, the media, and conservative elements within the Catholic church. These developments have allowed Fujimori to rule the country much like the CEO of a big, monopolistic transnational corporation. But how did this situation develop? ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Fujimori came to power by historical accident. In the 1990 presidential election, Peruvians overwhelmingly voted for him as a rejection of the traditional parties who had historically served the interests of the business elite and the military. Fujimori inherited from Alan Garcia's administration hyperinflation, chronic unemployment, high levels of poverty, political violence, government corruption, and cynicism in the political institutions. The country was in a catastrophic state. In promising Honesty, Technology, and Work, Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants and a political outsider, captivated the political imagination of the middle and lower classes. Tired of professional politicians, they were eager to embrace his call to modernize the Peruvian economy, the country's political institutions, and to bring "law and order" to the nation. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Fujimori realized from the very beginning that the Shining Path, the brutal and dogmatic guerrilla movement, and the MRTA, a Cuban inspired guerrilla group, posed a serious threat to the stability of the regime. These two organizations had been very active since the late 1970s in bloody military confrontations with the army. Fujimori played his populist card very well in gathering support among the middle and lower classes to implement his economic agenda and counterterrorist strategy. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ It is important to recognize that the two guerilla groups failed to understand the desperate economic condition of the middle and lower classes in the late 1980s. The common Peruvian with a family to feed, clothe, and educate did not give priority to political concerns in his/her daily struggle for economic survival. Shining Path and the MRTA badly miscalculated this situation and launched themselves into a revolutionary action without broad popular support. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The inability of the two guerrilla groups to gain popular support weakened the revolutionary credentials of both organizations among progressive segments of Peruvian society. The ideological dogmatism and military adventurism of both groups, combined with the lack of broad grassroots support essential to any mass social upheaval, limited the ability of both groups to organize effective mass uprisings, particularly in the cities. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Any chance of popular support was further weakened by the reckless political attitude of the Shining Path. In its dogmatic and anti-democratic strategy, Shining Path targeted for assassination community organizers, student leaders, union activists, peasant representatives and local officials who had disagreed with its philosophy and methods of carrying out social change. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Not surprisingly, the goverment-controlled media exploited Shining Path's atrocities, comparing them to those of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. Human rights groups, labor unions, student organizations, peasant leaders, and religious organizations denounced Shining Path tactics and questioned the validity of political violence as a means of achieving social change. The army used Shining Path atrocities as an excuse to demobilize progressive social organizations and carry out brutal military repression in remote areas under influence of Shining Path and the MRTA. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Without the active participation of important labour, peasant, and community organizations, the Shining Path's and MRTA's calls to arms were doomed to failure. Fujimori used this situation to further cement public support for a general crackdown against the "forces of disorder." ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ On April 5, 1992, with support of the military and the intelligence services, Fujimori decided to cope with the mounting economic crisis and the spiral of political violence facing the country by shutting down the unfriendly congress and the supreme court and suspending the constitution. So emerged a new caudillo, or strong man, for whom institutions, whether civilian or military, were not important to the functioning of democracy in developing countries. In getting rid of the traps of constitutional democracy, Fujimori was embracing the basic characteristic of the Peruvian political regime: an authoritarian and repressive system, wrapped in the disguise of constitutional legality. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ This "self-coup" was overwhelmingly supported by 80 per cent of the Peruvian people. Fujimori's "democratic populism" was working miracles. Moreover, in order to legitimize his power, please the international community, and implement economic reforms Fujimori created a new constitution, a new judiciary, and a new congress, which were essentially tailored to legitimize and enhance his authoritarian rule. The new legal instruments made him the sole arbiter of Peruvian politics. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ By 1993, Fujimori's counterterrorist strategy was producing good results. The main leader of the Shining Path, Chairman Gonzalo, was arrested that year, along with other important figures within the movement. This was a fatal blow to the Shining Path. The MRTA also suffered serious setbacks. Several leaders of the group were arrested, condemned by faceless military tribunals and sent to maximum security prisons where systematic torture, abuse, and complete isolation were used to destroy the morale and health of the prisoners. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Human rights groups, particularly Amnesty International, condemned the regime for its repressive and extra- judicial measures to eradicate guerilla groups. Foreign governments, particularly the United States and Canada, limited themselves to occasional criticisms of Fujimori's authoritarian rule, while enthusiastically encouraging corporations to take advantage of the economic opportunities opening up in Peru. Fujimori's promises of "jobs, jobs, jobs" enchanted unemployed Peruvÿþians, who saw in his neoliberal economic strategy the right prescription to the economic ills of the nation. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ By 1994, the economic situation in Peru had changed substantially. The reduction of inflation, privatization of state-controlled industries, increasing foreign investment, continuing foreign aid, and the reduction of political violence all contributed to the early "success" of Fujimori's economic agenda. The Peruvian business elite applauded the dictator, and there was strong optimism among the middle and lower classes that the new economic opportunities opening up were going to benefit them in the long run. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ From 1993 to 1996, Peru experienced a phase of rapid economic growth heavily dependent on foreign investment. The expansion of the mining, agricultural, fishing, and construction sectors helped economic expansion, and the invasion of fast food conglomerates (e.g.. McDonald's, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut) absorbed some temporarily unemployed workers. In 1997, however, the Peruvian "economic miracle" began to exhaust its growth potential. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ First, the export-oriented economy did not absorb the rapidly growing labour supply, resulting in a considerable increase in urban and rural unemployment. Secondly, the wages of the industrial workers did not rise as the economy developed, thus limiting the entrance of new consumers into the domestic market. Thirdly, industrial expansion, particularly in the mining sector tended to use capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive technology. This required the import of expensive industrial machinery and necessary raw materials unavailable within the country, thus contributing to the country's balance of payment problems. Finally, the economic boom strengthened the economic power of the business elite closely linked to foreign investors while worsening the living conditions of the low-wage working class. In other words, economic neoliberalism produced both wealth and poverty. Notwithstanding high rates of economic growth, the predominant experience of the majority of Peruvians was growing impoverishment, landlessness, and chronic unemployment. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Fujimori's economic agenda and authoritarian political style have recently come under attack from progressive sectors in the Peruvian society, who have perceived that his economic promises have benefited a small minority at the expense of the majority. As in many other Latin American countries, the neoliberal agenda in Peru is at the crossroads. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<fontÿþ ÿþsize="1"ÿþ>ÿþThis is the second in a three part series. Next issue: Fujimori under attack: the crisis of the authoritarian regime.ÿþ</font>ÿþ</font>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<formÿþ>ÿþ<inputÿþ ÿþtype="button"ÿþ ÿþvalue="Close"ÿþ ÿþonclick="top.close()"ÿþ>ÿþ</form>ÿþ ÿþ</body>ÿþ ÿþ</html>ÿþ<!-- FILE ARCHIVED ON ÿþ20:55:09 Jun 26, 2010ÿþ AND RETRIEVED FROM THE INTERNET ARCHIVE ON ÿþ09:45:59 Mar 05, 2026ÿþ. JAVASCRIPT APPENDED BY WAYBACK MACHINE, COPYRIGHT INTERNET ARCHIVE. ALL OTHER CONTENT MAY ALSO BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT (17 U.S.C. SECTION 108(a)(3)). --> <!-- ÿþplayback timings (ms): ÿþ ÿþcaptures_listÿþ: ÿþ0.807ÿþ ÿþ ÿþexclusion.robotsÿþ: ÿþ0.063ÿþ ÿþ ÿþexclusion.robots.policyÿþ: ÿþ0.045ÿþ ÿþ ÿþesindexÿþ: ÿþ0.012ÿþ ÿþ ÿþcdx.remoteÿþ: ÿþ15.732ÿþ ÿþ ÿþLoadShardBlockÿþ: ÿþ90.88ÿþ (ÿþ3ÿþ) ÿþ ÿþPetaboxLoader3.datanodeÿþ: ÿþ56.667ÿþ (ÿþ4ÿþ) ÿþ ÿþPetaboxLoader3.resolveÿþ: ÿþ63.222ÿþ (ÿþ2ÿþ) ÿþ ÿþload_resourceÿþ: ÿþ121.116ÿþ ÿþ-->