ÿþ<htmlÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<headÿþ>ÿþ<script type="text/javascript" src="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/js/bundle-playback.js?v=2N_sDSC0" charset="utf-8"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/js/wombat.js?v=txqj7nKC" charset="utf-8"></script>ÿþ ÿþ<script>window.RufflePlayer=window.RufflePlayer||{};window.RufflePlayer.config={"autoplay":"on","unmuteOverlay":"hidden","showSwfDownload":true};</script> <script type="text/javascript" src="ÿþhttps://web-static.archive.org/_static/ÿþjs/ruffle/ruffle.js"></script> ÿþ<script type="text/javascript"> ÿþ __wm.init(ÿþ"https://web.archive.org/web"ÿþ); __wm.wombat(ÿþ"http://www.newsocialist.org/old_mag/magazine/20/article10.html"ÿþ,ÿþ"20100626203754"ÿþ,ÿþ"https://web.archive.org/"ÿþ,ÿþ"web"ÿþ,ÿþ"https://web-static.archive.org/_static/"ÿþ, "ÿþ1277584674ÿþ"); </script> ÿþ<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/css/banner-styles.css?v=1utQkbB3" /> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="https://web-static.archive.org/_static/css/iconochive.css?v=3PDvdIFv" />ÿþ ÿþ<!-- End Wayback Rewrite JS Include --> ÿþ ÿþ<titleÿþ>ÿþNew Socialist Magazine, Social Movement Unionism: A Model for Labour? Part II - Articleÿþ</title>ÿþ ÿþ<metaÿþ ÿþname="description"ÿþ ÿþcontent="New Socialist Group socialism communism socialists communists "ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<metaÿþ ÿþname="keywords"ÿþ ÿþcontent="socialism, communism, socialists, communists, marx, marxists, marxism, Marx, Marxists, Marxism, Canada, politics, anarchism, Trotsky, trotskyism, NDP, radical, revolution, revolutionary, Lenin, leninism, leninist, Luxemburg, working class, 1917, syndicalism, radicalism, union, labour, anarchy"ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ</head>ÿþ ÿþ<bodyÿþ ÿþtopmargin="20"ÿþ ÿþleftmargin="20"ÿþ ÿþmarginheight="20"ÿþ ÿþmarginwidth="20"ÿþ ÿþbgcolor="#FFFFFF"ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<fontÿþ ÿþface="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"ÿþ ÿþsize="5"ÿþ ÿþcolor="#000000"ÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<centerÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<bÿþ>ÿþSocial Movement Unionism ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþA Model for Labour? ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþPart II ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ</b>ÿþ</font>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<fontÿþ ÿþface="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"ÿþ ÿþsize="2"ÿþ ÿþcolor="#000000"ÿþ>ÿþ by Anthony Goodwinÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<iÿþ>ÿþNew Socialist Magazine, July - August 1999ÿþ</i>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ</center>ÿþ Union organizing in Brazil shows the possibilities and potential difficulties of social movement unionism, especially when compared to some Canadian and US experiences. Key questions include the relationships between workplace rank-and-file organization and the union bureaucracy; workplace and community struggles; and working class movements and political organization. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Militant workplace unionism in Brazil originated in the Sao Paulo industrial district of Sao Bernardo de Campo where more than half the workers were employed in massive auto plants. The auto workers were represented by the Sao Bernardo Metal Workers Union (SBMWU), a union that was unusual in that it was led by left wing militants until 1964. In 1964, a Brazilian military installed corporatist (pro-State) leaders, derogatorily referred to as pelegos. Further repression in 1968 drove the militant opposition (composed of Catholic, communist and independent syndicalists) underground. After this defeat, these militants were reduced to a small network that concentrated their efforts to re-establishing links with the rank-and-file via workplace discussion and home visits. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The SBMWU leadership was particularly sensitive to the pressure of the militants' increasing influence with the rank-and-file workers. Unlike most pelegos, these union leaders were often drawn from the rank-and-file. Despite their dependency on the State, many pelegos were dissatisfied with State-imposed wage controls. These policies undermined the union's ability to provide gains for the rank-and-file. Most pelegos limited their dissension to token declarations and appeals. But the SBMWU pelegos began, in the mid-70s, to take active steps to support the militants' shop-floor organizing leading to a tense but effective division of labour. Militants developed the strength of shop-floor organization via the initiation of low-level industrial action, while the pelegos began to facilitate rank-and-file elaboration of union demands at mass meetings. In 1977, the SBMWU leadership began to use the yearly wage negotiations as a propaganda and mobilizing tool to demand an end to wage controls. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The strike waves of 1978-80 cemented the alliance between plant militants and the SBMWU leadership. The plant militants invariably initiated the strike activity while the union leaders were able to expand the strikes' impact through mass action and the development of plant-level delegate organization. This alliance between militant networks and rank-and-file oriented union leaders became the basis of the novo syndicalismo (new unionism) model in Brazil. Novo syndicalismo became the dominant current in the Brazilian labour movement, through its ability to impose workers'demands on employers and state. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ In the US, the most successful alliance between rank-and-file militants and left-wing functionaries is undoubtedly the democratization current within the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The long struggle of the rank-and-file caucus, Teamsters for a Democratic Union, against the notoriously corrupt and authoritarian union leadership was bolstered by an alliance with reform-minded functionaries who quickly succeeded in capturing the union's national executive. This victory of the reform slate, while short-lived, did make an impact in shifting the union's strategy in more a militant direction against corporate concession drives. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Despite the explicit social unionism ideology of the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), a comparable form of militant unionism has not emerged. The CAW leadership is more willing to mobilize its members than most unions. But there are clearly limits in terms of rank-and-file control. In the Victoria, B.C., bus drivers strike earlier this year, the union asked the membership was asked to ratify a contract without having the benefit of any details. The lack of a militant network with credibility amongst the rank-and-file in the CAW explains, in part, the union leaders limited commitment to democratic control. CAW militants seem to be more oriented to challenging the leadership through official union venues than via shop floor organizing. Pressure on the leaders without a shop floor base of activity seems to be of limited effect. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<bÿþ>ÿþLinking With Communitiesÿþ</b>ÿþ ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The full development of SMU in Brazil involved a merging of novo syndicalismo with mass community struggles, which flourished in the early 1980's (hastening the exit of the military dictatorship). The alliance with community struggles creating a broader working class movement that sought to address labour exploitation in the realms of both production and reproduction. Community movements in the sprawling and continually expanding periphery of Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest city, emerged out of the efforts of Christian activist networks. They spurred existing community associations to take up struggles for squatter rights and access to social services. Previously many of these organizations had been pressure groups and/or electoral machines for local politicians. Now these associations used militant action, such as land invasions, to advance their demands. These same community groups also identified with and supported the labour struggles of the late-1970s. Christian liberation groups urged members to join unions and support industrial actions while sympathetic clergy provided church space for union meetings. Community solidarity was generated through mass contributions to strike funds and a widespread refusal to scab. The direct link between workers in both the community and the workplace led to community demands being raised in workplace struggles. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The explicit class character of Brazilian community movements demonstrates how workplace and community organizations can relate to one another. Marxists have long recognized the primacy of the former as a means of building working class power. Much less addressed is the sustaining ability of community organization. While it is difficult for working people to exert much power through community action alone, the relative autonomy of community life, compared to the alienation of the workplace, provides a site of developing working class agency beyond the watchful eye of management. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ Most community organizations in North America tend to lack a class dimension (e.g. posing themselves as class-neutral citizens' groups). Class-based community organizations such as anti-poverty groups tend to be completely disconnected from labour unions. An interesting exception is the series of Living Wage Campaigns launched in numerous US cities during the 1990s. Led by labour-community coalitions, these campaigns have fought to set a base wage level for the workers of companies that receive state contracts. This in turn has helped union organizing drives and sparked the founding of New class/community organizations. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<bÿþ>ÿþClass Movements and Political Partiesÿþ</b>ÿþ ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ The result of working class attempts to influence broader politics depends upon both their own strategy and the state of existing class organizations. US labour unions have uÿþsually adopted the strategy of influencing the Democratic Party. In Canada, the trade unions originally approached the Liberal Party in a similar fashion, but were rebuffed. In Brazil, popular movements had a long tradition of appealing to populist political patrons in the Brazilian state. Socialists have always maintained the importance of building independent class political parties. What has often been overlooked is the character of these independent parties. Workers' political parties created by the trade union bureaucracy (usually in alliance with liberal intellectuals) tend to become bureaucratic electoral machines. They do not bother to relate to aspects of working class life outside the bourgeois political process. The new workplace/community social unionism in Brazil opted to create its own political alternative, the Workers Party. The Workers Party uses elections to increase the capacity of workplace and community struggles, rather than an end in themselves. It is no coincidence that the bureaucratization of the Brazilian novo syndicalismo current during the 1990s was accompanied by the transformation of the Workers Party from a movement of movements to an electoral vehicle. The embryonic militant labour current in the US has made moves to create its own political alternative, the Labor Party. There are differences within the party as to its purpose. Should it be a pressure group on the Democrats or to act as an independent political force? However, even if the party does assume an independent form, will the Labor Party will be anything more than an electoral front? Reducing working class political action to either a lobbyist and/or an electoralist entity reinforces not only the vicious circle of class apathy and bureaucratic substitutionism but also the principle of sectoralism, (i.e. the division of working class concerns into isolated spheres, each with its own organizational custodian). The Labor Party has emerged exclusively from union circles. The lopsided nature of the political project is likely to reinforce the tendency towards sectoralism. A key concern is the extent to which the party directs its activities (whether through elections or other means) to address this deficiency. ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ<brÿþ>ÿþ ÿþ<formÿþ>ÿþ<inputÿþ ÿþtype="button"ÿþ ÿþvalue="Close"ÿþ ÿþonclick="top.close()"ÿþ>ÿþ</form>ÿþ ÿþ</body>ÿþ ÿþ</html>ÿþ<!-- FILE ARCHIVED ON ÿþ20:37:54 Jun 26, 2010ÿþ AND RETRIEVED FROM THE INTERNET ARCHIVE ON ÿþ10:10:02 Mar 05, 2026ÿþ. JAVASCRIPT APPENDED BY WAYBACK MACHINE, COPYRIGHT INTERNET ARCHIVE. ALL OTHER CONTENT MAY ALSO BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT (17 U.S.C. SECTION 108(a)(3)). --> <!-- ÿþplayback timings (ms): ÿþ ÿþcaptures_listÿþ: ÿþ1.006ÿþ ÿþ ÿþexclusion.robotsÿþ: ÿþ0.074ÿþ ÿþ ÿþexclusion.robots.policyÿþ: ÿþ0.057ÿþ ÿþ ÿþesindexÿþ: ÿþ0.014ÿþ ÿþ ÿþcdx.remoteÿþ: ÿþ29.408ÿþ ÿþ ÿþLoadShardBlockÿþ: ÿþ91.152ÿþ (ÿþ3ÿþ) ÿþ ÿþPetaboxLoader3.datanodeÿþ: ÿþ106.819ÿþ (ÿþ4ÿþ) ÿþ ÿþload_resourceÿþ: ÿþ157.973ÿþ ÿþ ÿþPetaboxLoader3.resolveÿþ: ÿþ98.908ÿþ ÿþ-->