The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) just celebrated its 20-year anniversary in November and the 10-year anniversary of their uprising in Chiapas, Mexico this past New Year's Eve. On November 17, 1983, the EZLN was formed by six urban Marxists who moved to Chiapas, in the south-eastern part of the country. The group's most well-known and photogenic leader, Subcomandante Marcos, did not actually arrive until the year after. At that time, EZLN was 50 percent mestizo (of mixed ancestry) and 50 percent Indigenous.
The Evolution Of Revolution
The EZLN's initial story is one of profound political and strategic evolution. Through their efforts to build relationships with the local Indigenous people in the first three years, their foundation became a unique combination of the struggle for Indigenous land and culture rights, and the fairly academic Marxism of that original handful of urbanites. Twenty years later the EZLN is led by the General Command of the Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Council (CCRI-CG) and is 99 percent Indigenous, almost half being women. Their rich political perspective has informed not only how they construct their platform but also what are often confusing strategies for those on the outside.
On December 31, 1993, on the eve of the inception of NAFTA and the destruction of collective land rights it would cause, the EZLN became known to the world. That night they declared war on the Mexican government, in the name of their struggle for work, land, shelter, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and a peace with dignity. By internet we found out that 4,500 front-line EZLN combatants (with 2,000 in reserve) simultaneously took over seven municipal seats in the state of Chiapas. It was a strategically shocking and inspirational action for leftists throughout Mexico and around the world. It sparked immediate solidarity activities whose intensity lasted internationally for four to five years after.
The base of the EZLN's struggle was and still is the recognition of the Indigenous right to real self-determination, not just in Chiapas but in all of Mexico. This was the necessary starting point because of the colonial-based, racist conditions of exploitation the Zapatistas and other Indigenous Mexicans live under. It was also fundamental because, like in the Americas as a whole, their oppression and exploitation is a central part of a system that generates alarming wealth for Mexican elites and international investors.
After what many radical observers felt was an overly-quick move to the table, between early January 1994 and February 1997, cease-fire and peace negotiations with the state took place. These talks did not happen in a political vacuum: the EZLN made numerous impressive efforts to develop and broaden international and national solidarity; indeed, to set an example for waging 'Zapatismo' everywhere. On February 16, 1996, the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture were signed, a document that would see true material recognition of land, culture and other self-determination rights for Indigenous people.
The "Peace" Process
Unfortunately, since that time the State - first under the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and since July 2000 under President Vicente Fox of the PAN (National Action Party) - has whittled away at the struggle's momentum by taking over the "peace process" and dragging it out. The ruling class continues to privatize and otherwise exploit every resource possible. And the Mexican minimum wage is still generally 21 pesos a day, thousands of campesinos have been pushed off their land by NAFTA-related constitutional changes to ejido (collective lands) tenure, and people's misery deepens.
Fox's PAN has been smart in its treatment of the EZLN demands. After the failure of the previous Ernesto Zedillo government to implement the San Andres accords, in early 1997 the Zapatistas walked away from the table. With the level of national and international solidarity and the momentum of the time, this became a powerful political move. They announced that they would focus on development of the 38 regions already declared autonomous and would not come back to the table until the state met three conditions: full implementation of the accords; liberation of all Zapatista political prisoners; and retreat of the Mexican army from Zapatista-supporting Chiapanecan communities. With a lot of talk of peace and a new (post-PRI) era, in response the PAN passed a meaningless Bill in April 2001 that had no real self-determination and land control provisions for Indigenous communities. As well, they released a number of prisoners and moved the army out of most parts of rural Chiapas.
As a result, while the EZLN maintains these three conditions today, the way the State manipulated the process and consolidated its economic and social control has left the Zapatistas with little to bargain. What is the threat they pose? Where is the militant momentum to demand that the real accords be implemented, that the remaining 16 prisoners be set free and the last two army barracks dismantled?
Nonetheless, under the CCRI-CG's leadership, the EZLN has continued to defend and build the Zapatista-supporting communities' efforts at real autonomy. In the autonomous zones, governing councils "leading by obeying" community people have worked on localizing and replacing state functions, with health, resource management and education being priorities. And this despite ongoing paramilitary incursions, expulsions from the land, and all out massacres, such as that of 45 Indigenous people of Acteal in December 1997.
Caracoles: Inching Towards Autonomy
After what they describe as a long period of reflection, on August 9, 2003 the CCRI-CG announced a big new step: they would transform the autonomous zones from rebel territory to civilly administered regions. The new term for these formations is the "Caracoles" (snails), the idea being that the building of autonomous communities and lives needs the patience and calmness of a snail. A significant part of this shift is the pull-out of the Zapatista army from the governance of the zones. Marcos is no longer spokesperson for any community and, while not disarming, the EZLN is retiring to six positions from which they can be called to defend communities if need be. The governance has now become a regional network system whereby a number of communities are connected through a Good-Government Council, and the Councils are then connected to each other. The practice is democracy from below, on land the people have not ceded and with a broadening political structure that will continue to plan for economic and social activities.
Once again, analysis of Zapatista strategy defies conventional categories. On the one hand, we can see this as part of the EZLN's capacity to maintain their relevance and keep developing their struggle, even in a very difficult period. On the other, it might seem that the CCRI-CG believes radical social change can come from side-stepping the idiocy of bad governments and capitalists, and focusing locally instead. It's also seen by some as a way out for a defeated rebel army. Yet, it is clear that EZLN militants still promote a very working-class analysis of their struggle, as they continue to try and rally other Mexican workers to a more militant, coordinated fight. Just this past November in a video shown nation-wide for the 20th anniversary commemorations, EZLN Comandante Felipe reached out to workers saying that, just like campesinos, workers are part of the means of production of the rich so they all need to struggle together. As part of his animating speech he also said, "We, the Zapatistas, struggle for all the poor of Mexico. We will kill and we will die to get good health care, nutrition, land, jobs, education, justice, freedom, democracy, independence, equality - including women - communication, information and peace … You can't really believe that the rich are one day (just) going to give up their exploitation of us?"
Key to grasping the EZLN's struggle today is understanding that, just as in most other parts of the world, a Mexican workers' mass movement is not about to happen - a fact which has frustrated the EZLN for at least ten years. At the time of the uprising, Marcos said that their original dream was to fight on to Mexico City, if they could have tapped into the will of other Mexicans to join them. Probably this was more of a dream than a plan but it demonstrates the integrated political perspective they have always had, regardless of their strategic difficulties and tactical curiosities. Mexican Indigenous land and self-determination rights form the base of universal struggle for an end to oppression and exploitation for Mexicans as a whole. The focus on autonomy in local communities in rebellion is therefore not just inward-looking reformism; it is a necessary step in invoking their own rights and it is happening with such a local focus because of circumstances outside of their control. While the donations brought in by caravans and solidarity activists are important, without a broad-based, nation-wide mass movement, at the end of the day the EZLN and these communities are on their own.
Sheila Wilmot was actively involved in Zapatista solidarity work for the first five years after the 1994 uprising.